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SUBJECT: JOINT WEEKA NO. 6

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EXTERNAL - POLITICAL

1. Soviet Foreign Relations. The Western Hemisphere occupied the spotlight position in foreign news coverage in the Soviet press during the period of February 1 - 8. Much space was devoted to Cuba and the aftermath of the Punta del Este Conference, which was characterized as a "diplomatic Waterloo" for the US, but which, if an intelligent Soviet citizen read between the lines, could be seen as a development presenting new problems for the expansion of Soviet influence in Latin America through Cuba and Castro. Khrushchev chose to reveal his whereabouts to the Soviet public for the first time in 26 days by giving an interview to the Brazilian Charge d'Affaires in Sochi. Although Khrushchev may have special reasons for wanting to see the Brazilian representative, the choice of a Latin American for an interview to prove to the Soviet people and to the world that he is alive and healthy, and thus to brush off rumors that he was shot at by a would-be assassin, underlined current Soviet preoccupation with Latin America.

No major developments came to light in the sphere of the Soviet-Chinese quarrel. However, newspapers and journals kept up a steady barrage of articles attacking dogmatism-sectarianism and a wide range of theoretical propositions espoused by the Albanians and Chinese Communists.

The 80th anniversary of President Roosevelt's birth, which Soviet propaganda made much of the previous week, was not permitted to drop out of sight. Pravda and Izvestiya published the text of Mrs. Roosevelt's reply to Khrushchev's telegram on February 7 and other papers reported it, singling out those passages which might be used to bolster the Soviet contention that Roosevelt would have favored "peaceful coexistence" were he alive today. A Pravda article by Mamedov on February 8 urged President Kennedy to follow FDR's footsteps, to adopt an attitude of realism toward the USSR's alleged superiority of military and moral strength in the world, and to repudiate the advocates of a hard policy, among which Secretaries Rusk and MacNamara were identified. Meanwhile Attorney General Kennedy's tour of various foreign countries was presented as a difficult assignment of attempting to bolster crumbling US positions around the world.

2. Cuba. The Soviet press gave extremely heavy coverage to Cuba following up on the Punta del Este Conference. The main themes were: Soviet solidarity with the Cuban people, the inevitability of democratic revolutions throughout Latin America, and claims that Punta del Este was a defeat for the US. The full text of the "Second Havana Declaration" was printed in Pravda and full coverage was given to CASTRO and DORTICOS speeches, as well as the Soviet-Cuban statements in the UN debate on Cuba's charges against the US.

The press material appears generally defensive in tone and seems to reflect a recognition that the conference will be followed by the increasing isolation (and therefore diminishing utility) of Cuba. No notice was taken of Castro's avowal of Marxism-Leninism, nor was the 1960 Khrushchev threat to support Cuba with rockets alluded to.

3. Disarmament.



Article on Disarmament: The current issue of Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn (International Life) carries an article by S. Yefimov strongly criticizing the concepts of arms control and deterrence being discussed in numerous US journals. Yefimov contends that all arms control schemes deny the possibility and necessity of complete and general disarmament, especially as that concept is avowed by the Soviet Union. He also alleges that doctrines of deterrence are aggressive and anti-Soviet in their orientation. In his view, the effectiveness of the new 18-nation disarmament committee will depend largely on the US, but the outlook is dim since the US apparently still adheres firmly to the concept of arms control.

Yefimov did, however, give some indication that the Soviets were developing arguments and proposals to counter anticipated Western suggestions regarding measures which might be implemented at an early stage of the disarmament process. He criticized US advocates of arms control, for example, for not saying anything about measures dealing with (1) a ban on the use of nuclear weapons, (2) the cessation or curtailment of military production, (3) the cessation of scientific research on the improvement of weapons or the creation of new types, and (4) the liquidation of foreign military bases.

At the outset of the disarmament negotiations, the Soviets are likely to focus attention on their proposals for general and complete disarmament. Such an approach would not, however, exclude the early introduction of a series of separate measures along lines suggested by Yefimov and in the Soviet eight-point memorandum submitted at the UN on September 26, 1961. Variants of the proposals contained in a draft resolution submitted by the Poles at the 15th Session of the UN may also be advanced by the Soviets in the negotiations.

4. Nuclear Tests. The Soviet press has carried no announcement or information which would tend to confirm Western reports that the Soviets may have recently conducted an underground nuclear test. In the meantime, however, the Soviet press, as heretofore, promptly reports the short announcements released by the Atomic Energy Commission regarding the carrying out of US underground tests. Much attention is also given in the Soviet press to protest meetings being held in the West against the possible conduct of atmospheric tests by the US.

5. Berlin/Germany. The only significant commentary on Berlin or Germany to appear during the week was another "Observer" article in Izvestiya (Feb. 3) by Polyanov on the Gromyko-Thompson talks. The Soviet columnist, who has commented on each of the meetings so far, repeated his criticism of the US for

adhering to its previous positions and not accepting the free city proposal. He attacked the purported Western demand for "uncontrolled ... ess" and maintenance of the occupation statute, and hinted that the Soviet Union would negotiate with Bonn since talks with the Western powers are apparently futile.

6. Finnish Elections. The results of Finland's parliamentary elections have been interpreted by the Soviet press as proof of the popularity of a foreign policy based on friendship and cooperation with the USSR. The election gains by the Agrarians, and over-all increase by 200,000 votes garnered by the three parties (Agrarians, Peoples' Democratic Union, and Social Democratic opposition), described as supporters of the PAASAKIVI-KEKKONEN line, are cited as proof of this contention. The loss of three seats by the Communist-run PDU was dismissed as a "technicality of bourgeois democracy."

7. Iran. A TASS despatch from Rome cited the Italian journal Paese to report that the Iranian cabinet had taken a decision during January to create special shock detachments to suppress the student movement. The despatch also reported that the Shah believed that this would compromise the position of Prime Minister Amini and would provide an opportunity to replace him with General Backtiar. The despatch claimed that the British Ambassador supported the viewpoint of the Shah while US Ambassador Holmes supported the position of Amini, who believed that the use of political repression would serve as a means to strengthen his power and influence in Iran.

8. Italy - "Opening to the Left". The Soviet press, obviously displeased with developments regarding the Italian Government, nevertheless treated the decision to form a new government with Socialist support cautiously. Soviet criticism concentrated on the Christian Democratic Party's motives for the decision -- which are ascribed to a determination to undermine the CPI and to split the "democratic mass organizations." The decision by the Socialists to join in this coalition attributed to the efforts of "Nenni's Supporters." Pravda said that the Socialists received only vague promises in exchange for their support of this bourgeoise coalition.

9. Laos. Within the framework of its usual practice of saying little about Laotian developments, the Soviet press indicated that efforts to bring about a peaceful settlement in Laos have not been going smoothly owing to alleged cease-fire violations by Phoumi involving the use of Thai, South Vietnam and Chinese Nationalist troops and US officers.

INTERNAL - POLITICAL

10. Leadership: The week was a-flutter with rumor and report:

KHRUSHCHEV, whom Pravda's front page on February 8 demonstratively pictured smiling and gesticulating at the Brazilian Charge d'Affaires, was clearly near Sochi, on February 7, after nearly a month during which his activities were reported only once: on January 26, when he received the head of a Burmese economic delegation, U CHIN, at Kiev -- although the Soviet press, oddly, did not disclose the place of their meeting.

During the last three days of January, rumors began circulating among Soviet citizens in Moscow that an attempt had been made to assassinate him. (Embassy's A-623, February 2), perhaps while he was in Byelorussia during the second and third weeks of January, but, in any case, sometime "during the past four weeks." Although even this aspect of the incident was initially the subject of contradictory reports, it now appears that the Moscow correspondent of the Italian Communist Party's newspaper l'Unita sent the story to his newspaper on February 6. Although he had been persistently alerted to the rumors by a number of his "usually reliable" Soviet sources, he covered his tracks by checking with his Western colleagues, asking them "Have you heard ...?" When they acknowledged that they had, but had not sent the story for fear of reprisals from the Foreign Ministry's Press Department, he himself sent it as based upon "reports circulating among Western correspondents." The Foreign Ministry denied the story as "ridiculous" and "dangerous", no doubt using the latter word to convey a warning to non-Communist correspondents who might be tempted to belabor it.

V. M. MOLOTOV was reported to have returned home on or about February 6 after a stretch in the clinic of Dr. A. I. KHRIMLIAN with the grippe. Khrimlian's clinic, it was said, is located some 18 kilometers out of Moscow, and is not to be confused with the Kremlin's clinic in Moscow, as had been done at the outset by a Western correspondent whose ear proved to be insensitive to the Russian language.

K. Ye. VOROSHILOV's name also popped up twice more. As "one of the oldest leaders of the Communist Party", he was the second choice of Soviet of the Union election district No. 29, at Kashira, Moscow Oblast, to run in the March 18 Supreme Soviet elections. First choice: N. S. Khrushchev (Leninskoye znamya, February 8). The organ of the Ministry of Defense, Red Star (Feb. 7), provided the counterpoint to Voroshilov's nomination by accusing him of disseminating a false picture of STALIN's military contributions in his 1929 pamphlet "Stalin and the Red Army." Unlike those members of the Party's central organs who were dropped at the XXII CPSU Congress - ARISTOV, FURTSEVA, IGNATOV, KIRILENKO, MUKHITDINOV, POSPELOV, and KALNBERZIN -- all of them deputies to the expiring Supreme Soviet who have not yet been reported in the press as having received nominations, Voroshilov now seems a good bet to be returned to the Supreme Soviet -- although only as the representative of Kashira district, and not from his present prestigious constituency, Kirov district of Leningrad.

The anomaly of Voroshilov's nomination paralleled continuing evidence of disagreement between the Soviet Communist Party's two leading ideologists: M.A. SUSLOV and L. F. ILYICHEV. The February publication of Suslov's report to the social-science conference (WEEKA No. 5, February 2) showed that, while some of the more striking differences between them (Embassy's Despatch No. 664, January 29) had been muted -- at least for public consumption, serious disagreement persists (see below).

Thus, to the accompaniment of dissonant strains, the Party marches towards its Central Committee plenum, set for March 5, the ninth anniversary of the death of I. V. Stalin.

11. Leadership: Cutting Up the Nominations Pie. The campaign of nomination of candidates for the March 18 Supreme Soviet election is in full swing (WEEKA No. 5). Soviet elections are "a school of socialist democracy", in which the Party makes the final determination of the sole candidate who will stand from each district. The urge of lower Party bosses is to display their loyalty to those Party leaders whom they regard as strongest and most capable of rewarding the faithful and punishing the delinquent. In order to avoid a situation in which the few most prominent Party leaders, e.g., at the present time, Khrushchev and Kozlov, are nominated in every district, while the less prominent are more or less neglected, the leadership arranges matters so that the pattern of nominations reflects the standing of individual leaders relative to each other. In 1958, for example, BULGANIN's surprisingly low standing in the final nomination results was sure confirmation of his decline, and was shortly followed by his removal from the Chairmanship of the Council of Ministers.

The results of the nomination campaign thus far display a consistent pattern, subject only to fluctuations within the sub-groups into which members of the leadership fall. A count based on the Moscow-area press through February 8 and the republican press through February 4 produces this line-up:

I.	KHRUSHCHEV	136
II.	BREZHNEV	39
III.	KOZLOV	37
IV.	SUSLOV	20
V.	KOSYGIN	16
	MIKOYAN	16
	VORONOV	15
VI.	KUUSINEN	10
	POLYANSKIY	8
	PODGORNY	7
	SHVERNIK	7

Below the 11 full members of the Presidium fall the non-Presidium members of the Presidium with SHELEPIN -- 4 nominations -- at their head.

Khrushchev's name thus has been put forward in 45 percent of the 301 election districts which have nominated any of the 11 full members of the Presidium. This is considerably above the approximately 33-1/3 percent he scored in the 1958 nomination campaign.

Within their groupings, Mikoyan and Podgorny have been slow starters, both having stood alone at the bottom of groups V and VI, respectively, until the press reports of February 8 gave them a boost.

Voronov, the First Deputy Chairman of the Central Committee's Bureau for the RSFSR, who was co-opted into the top Party leadership only just over a year ago (January, 1961, CC Plenum), is obviously a comer, standing, as he does, with the two First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers in the listing.

If the campaign follows past precedent, the flow of press reports of nominations should end within two or three days, to be followed shortly thereafter by an announcement stating in which electoral district each of the top leaders will stand. It will then be possible to compile a definitive tabulation of the results of the nomination campaign.

12. Tomb Repairs Continue. While it may be the case that new air-conditioning equipment is being installed at the V. I. LENIN mausoleum (WEEKA No. 5, Feb.2) it is clear that a new name-stone has been installed. On February 8, the temporary wooden wall erected two weeks ago still stood around the shrine on Red Square. A huge block of stone wrapped in heavy padding and boards had been set in the place where formerly the "Lenin-Stalin" name-stone rested. Presumably, when the protective wrapping is removed, it will reveal the inscription "Lenin".

13. Suslov-Ilyichev Debate Continues. On January 30-31, CPSU-CC Presidium Member and CC Secretary M. A. Suslov addressed an All-Union social-science conference which met in the Kremlin from January 30 to February 2. His report has not been published in full. Instead, four days later, an abridged "stenographic transcript" was published by Pravda (February 4, 1962). This report, as published, indicated that some pains had been taken to mute some of the more striking differences between Agitprop Chief and CC Secretary L.F.ILYICHEV and Suslov (Embassy's Despatch No. 664, January 29). The text of Suslov's report plays up areas in which both men appear to hold similar views (e.g., on co-existence, some areas of internal Party policy, and strong condemnation of non-conformity in the arts).

Indications of continued disagreement were, however, still discernible. Suslov stated, for example, that "the Party began to restore Leninist norms of public life immediately after Stalin's death" on March 5, 1953. Ilyichev, in his article in Kommunist, No. 1, 1962, on the other hand, cautiously fixes the beginning of the restoration of Leninist norms as the XX CPSU Congress in February, 1956. His contention is stated baldly in a leading article in Questions of Philosophy (No. 1, 1962; signed to the press January 25, 1962), which bears clear internal evidence of being an Ilyichevite document: "The XX Congress of the Leninist Party marked the beginning of a new stage in the life of our country ... The Party ... took a decisive course towards ... the restoration of Leninist principles in Party, state, and ideological activity" (p.3).

The importance of this difference in definition is clear. If the Party began the restoration of Leninist norms immediately after Stalin's death, the "anti-Party group", who were members in good standing of the then ruling "collective leadership", obviously performed "some services for the Party and people" -- services that perhaps justify allowing them to remain members of the Party. If, however, Leninist norms were only restored beginning with the XX Congress, and only triumphed after a sharp struggle with an "anti-Party group"

which opposed their restoration, then there is no reason not to eject these "anti-Leninists" from the Party.

The appearance of D. I. CHESNOKOV at the conference poses another riddle. Chesnokov, now director of the Department of Philosophy at Moscow State University, followed Suslov as the first speaker in the "debate" on his report. In better days, he had been one of Stalin's chief theoreticians. He was a member (as were Suslov, Khrushchev, and others among the present leadership) of the "Large Presidium" during Stalin's last days.

The significance of the Ilyichev-Suslov debate is not yet clear. What is important, however, is that a controversy between the two top Party theoreticians on fundamental issues is permitted to continue without the Party's stepping in to settle it. Perhaps this will be attempted at the coming March 5 plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.

14. Trouble With the Youth. Western observers of the Soviet scene have long observed that the regime was having plenty of difficulties in its efforts to create a "new Communist man." Especially among the youth, less docile than the older generations which felt the full impact of the Stalin era, there are many indications of resistance to the demands made by the Party for compliance with its "new moral code". The most recent and authoritative statements on this resistance and on non-conformist trends among the youth were from:

(1) CC Secretary M. A. Suslov (Pravda, February 4):

> "Among a part (even if a small one) of the students, there is a light-minded approach to study and disrespect for labor, as well as traits of petty-bourgeois dissoluteness and a striving to imitate the bad taste brought in from bourgeois countries. There are also cases of gross violations of academic discipline and the rules of socialist living, acts of immorality, hooliganism, drunkenness, which are not always rebuffed and condemned by the student body."

(2) CC Secretary L. F. Ilyichev (Pravda, December 27):

> "Stressing the great educational role of literature and art, the speaker (Ilyichev) dealt specifically on erroneous tendencies in some of the works about the young generation ... Skepticism is the distinguishing feature of the young people depicted by V. AKSENOV and V. ROZOV. However, instead of criticizing it, the authors show sympathy, in spite of the fact that this skepticism casts doubt on everything in the world."

15. Continuing Crackdown On Religion. During the last few months, there has been a substantial increase in the volume of atheistic and anti-religious material published in the Soviet press. The content of much of this supports the view that a general campaign is under way to suppress religion in general and evangelical sects in particular.

The methods employed by Party activists operating against religious groups are sometimes vicious. For example, Izvestiya of January 22, 1962, publishes an article about two girls aged 20 and 30 who undertook a hunger-strike to the death as the only means at their disposal of protesting against harassment of their Baptist sect by militant atheists in the town of Uzlovaya, Tula Oblast, 110 miles south of Moscow. It is not difficult to read between the lines when Izvestiya states that "the atheists went to the homes of the believers for individual work." Subsequently, the "circle of beli rs decreased each year." Izvestiya describes this act of desperation on the part of the two young women as a stunt to restore the shaken faith of their fellow believers and suggests it is high time for the authorities to step in.

L. F. Ilyichev, in his report to the December 25-28 Moscow ideological conference, gives good reason to believe that harassment such as this will continue on an increasing scale. He said: "On the whole, we have conducted a great amount of work in the atheistic education of the working people: the overwhelming majority of the Soviet people are conscientious atheists. But religious survivals are very much alive and grip millions of people.

"The speaker (Ilyichev) cited a number of facts testifying to serious shortcomings in conducting scientific-atheistic propaganda in certain regions and republics."

Turning the pages of the press during any one week since the beginning of 1962, reveals an increasing number of stories in which the element of religious persecution is suggested, if not openly admitted, by the presentation of the facts. This week, for example, there were the following articles in the central press alone:

(1) Five Evangelicals exiled to forced labor for spreading the gospel by tape-recorder (Soviet Culture, February 3);

(2) Four churchgoers sentenced to death for allegedly participating in the murder of a non-believer (Pravda, February 5);

(3) Trial and sentencings of a group of wildly fanatical Fiftiers (Trud, February 6);

(4) A call to Komsomol activists to take action against church activities (Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and Protestant) in Lvov Oblast (Komsomolskaya Pravda, February 7).

MILITARY (ARMY)

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FOR THE AMBASSADOR:

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